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Abstract
The overriding concern of this paper is to examine 
opportunities and constraints of provider-payment system 
being used to manage health insurance in Ghana. Mindful 
of this objective, the study employed a survey approach 
to collect data, which involved the use of questionnaires, 
interviews and observation. Three out of the ten 
administrative regions were randomly selected to for the 
study. Thirty insurance schemes and 30 health service 
providers were randomly selected given that regions were 
our unit of analysis. Apart from these, 50 subscribers were 
purposively selected from Greater Accra; Central, Brong-
Ahafo, and Ashanti regions were sampled for the study 
with a response rate of 97%. The results of the study show 
that inadequate funding characterised by delays in the 
release of subsidies result in the interruption of payment 
to service providers. Though the payment system is rated 
as satisfactory, it does not allow providers to achieve 
reasonable cash flow and as such it affects the value of 
health care provided to subscribers. The disruptions in 
re-imbursements can potentially undermine quality of 
health services provided to subscribers. It is therefore 
recommended that the national insurance authority 
devised mechanisms that will ensure prompt payment 
to providers as one of the several means of promoting 
quality healthcare.
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In 2003, the Ghanaian Parliament enacted the National 
Health Insurance Act, 2003, (Act 650) and its Regulation, 
(LI 1809) and subsequently launched by the then 
President, John Agyekum Kufour on March 18, 2004 
with the intention of offering affordable medical care 
to all Ghanaians, especially the poor and vulnerable in 
the society. The scheme therefore supplanted the cost-
recovery health delivery system (cash and carry) system 
since 1985. Thus the up-front payment system for health 
services at government clinics and hospitals.
Since the introduction of the health insurance scheme, 
records available show that many ordinary Ghanaians can 
access health care as and when needed. However, for the 
scheme to be a lasting one there is the need for suitable 
provider payment system to ensure accurate processing 
of claim and payment of claims. Though this is not the 
only ingredient for the success of the scheme, a reliable 
provider payment system and procedures rank among the 
top reasons for sustainability of health insurance schemes 
(Birenbaum & Speen, 2000).
One can therefore argue that with improved or 
regular subscriptions, the capacity of providers to 
deliver satisfactory services will be bolstered, especially 
when claims are paid regularly and transparent. Studies 
(example, Jacobs & Goddard, 2000) have shown that 
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effectiveness in provision of health care depends on 
structures, expertise, and motivation.  The successes 
of social health insurance schemes in some European 
countries are largely attributed to meeting particular 
objectives, particularly, in giving near universal access 
to care, services that are satisfactory to the public 
and a degree of unity.  This is perhaps due in part to 
the enhanced transparency of financial flows and the 
acceptability of funding for health care (Jacobs & 
Goddard, 2000).  Social health insurance systems have 
evolved and continue to exist in the developed countries 
due to transparency in their operations.
Recent studies conducted by Joint Development 
Partners Mission (AIDE MEMORE, 2007) indicate that 
the National Health Insurance Scheme Ghana faces a 
number of challenges.  These challenges include lack of 
systems to conduct financial sustainability analysis at 
the operational level; shortage of staff to deal with claim 
management; and lack of effective and efficient claims 
processing management.  Other recent public discussions 
about the scheme point to the inability of some health 
insurance scheme operators to pay health providers on 
time for the services provided. Furthermore, a Project 
Information Document (PID) of the Government of 
Ghana, Report number AB2581 (2006), has found that 
there are a number of important issues that require urgent 
attention to ensure sustainability of the scheme, which 
includes delays in issuing identification to registered 
patrons; difficulties in registering the informal sector; and 
increasing financial deficits in some districts.
Clearly, there are deficiencies in the provider 
payment system and procedures for the smooth running 
of the scheme in relation to disbursement of funds that 
guarantees constant funds availability. Nevertheless, 
a search through available literature shows virtually 
no empirical studies that have assessed the accounting 
systems of the scheme in Ghana. Besides, public entities 
in Ghana, have, over the years, have had to fold-up due 
poor and weak managerial (financial and operational). 
Although health insurance allows most people to make 
contributions towards future or present health financing, 
making sustainability issues fundamental to the current 
health financing system. This paper thus examines the 
provider payment system of the District Mutual Health 
Insurance Schemes and provides recommendations on 
how best the scheme can be sustained.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The mainstream insurance business consists of an 
insurance entity (insurer) and the insured (individual). 
However, with social health insurance, aside the insurer 
and the insured, there is a third party; that is, the provider. 
In the case of social health insurance schemes, providers 
are the various health delivery facilities, which symbolises 
the expenditure spectrum. The number of services and 
products that are given or consumed and the prices decide 
the expenditure on health care. These issues are controlled 
by the provider payment system. Providers can decide 
the claim for their own services and products, when the 
patient takes the first initiative to contact health systems.
Consequently, the nature of relationship that prevails 
between insurance payment systems and service providers 
can influence the number of treatments, attract patients, 
be selective in types of patients to treat and can also resort 
to the use of unnecessarily expensive equipment in order 
to amortise their cost. Provider payment systems should 
permit the providers to attain a reasonable income, so as 
to promote good quality services to patients (Normand 
& Weber, 1994). In the health insurance industry, billing 
involves the process by which health care providers 
charge, code, and submit their bills (in the form of a 
claim) to the health insurance company.
There are many diverse methods for paying providers 
and each method has an effect on the value of health care 
services, cost containment and administration (Normand 
& Weber, 1994). Provider payments may be classified as 
either prospective or retrospective (Barnum, Kutzin, & 
Saxenian 1995).
Among some of popular provider payment systems are 
fee for service is a retrospective payment. Generally, it is 
known as a fee-for-service payment; this is where services 
are rendered before payment is made (Partners for Health 
Reformplus Project, 2005). The fee or prices could be 
uncontrolled; meaning that the provider can charge the 
rate the market will pay. Another dimension of the fee for 
service is to set compulsory rates that may represent the 
upper or lower limit of the prices that could be charged. 
In Germany for example, physicians who would want to 
treat social health insurance patients are required to stick 
to a schedule of fees and that charges must not exceed or 
be lower than what is in the fee schedule. Under a fee-for-
service system, physicians can raise their net income by 
offering more services if the tariff is set above marginal 
cost (Kwon, 1997). 
Capitation is another method of provider payment 
system, which is flat monthly fee that a health plan pays 
to a provider to take care of patients’ needs. According to 
Jacobs and Goddard (2007), capitation is where a fixed 
amount per person, is paid to the health maintenance 
organisation. Capitation is a fixed sum per person paid in 
advance of the coverage period to a healthcare entity in 
consideration of its providing, or arranging to provide, 
contracted healthcare services to the eligible person for the 
specified period. For instance, a provider could be given 
a capitation premium of a specific amount for each month 
for every member of a particular health plan. In return 
for this capitation, the hospital accepts to give hospital 
services to all members of that health plan, despite the 
actual price for the services (Bourdon et al., p. 104).
The case payment system is based on single cases 
rather than single treatment act. Each diagnosis the 
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physician treats attracts payment of a fee.  Two genres of 
case payment systems are case based payment on a single 
flat rate per case, despite diagnosis while the second is 
based on schedule of diagnoses.
Daily charge is also known as the per diem fee. 
According to Norman & Weber (1994), daily charge fees 
are used to pay providers who take care of patient for 
long periods. The fees cover all services and expenses 
per patient per day. The payment is always the same, 
regardless of the treatment required.
Finally, some payments under health insurance 
schemes could also be through bonuses. A bonus payment 
is made to providers as incentives to accomplish specific 
goals. It could be toward attaining an economic goal or 
due to a country’s health policy goals. For instance, if 
the economic goal is to lower national drugs bill, then 
incentives could be given to physicians who prescribe 
fewer drugs but maintain quality prescriptions leading to 
cost reduction.
GHANA IN CONTEXT:  PROVIDER-
PAYMENT SYSTEM
Presently, in Ghana, the National Health Insurance 
Council sets tariffs for provider payments.  According 
to the Health Insurance Regulations, LI 1809, payment 
for health care services rendered by providers may be 
made by any of the following systems: capitation, fee-for-
service or any other payment system that the Council may 
determine.
The National Health Insurance Act, 2003, Act 650 
(Section 71:1), states “tariffs payable to healthcare 
providers shall be paid within four weeks by schemes 
to the healthcare providers”. It is required that service 
providers provide correct and sufficient information for 
claims; and also comply with any provision in the Act and 
Regulations before payment can be made (Section 71:3). 
The LI1809, Sec. 37, states that for a fee-for-service 
payment the health care facility and the attending health 
care personnel should file the claim on a claim form (Form 
4, i.e. In-Patient Treatment Costing Sheet) provided in 
Schedule I of the Health Insurance Regulations.
It is also required that hospitals attach Forms 4, 5 (i.e. 
Health Facility Attendance Card), and 6 (i.e. Diagnostic 
Card) to the clinical records of a patient upon admission. 
In the case of admission, the patient should be discharged 
only when the attending medical officer and the patient 
sign or thumbprint the Form 4.  A claim for payment of 
health care services provided under a scheme licensed 
under Act 650 should be filed within sixty calendar 
days from the date of the discharge of the patient or 
the rendering of the service. Except in the case of an 
emergency, a claim for payment not made within the 
stipulated period is barred upon the expiry of the period 
stated. All claims should be paid directly to the health care 
facility and under no circumstances should direct payment 
be made to a patient. A claim for payment of health care 
service rendered which is submitted to a scheme should, 
unless there is any legal impediment, be paid by the 
scheme within four weeks after the receipt of the claim 
from the health care facility. 
METHODS OF STUDY
An exploratory survey approach was considered the 
most appropriate for achieving the objective of this study 
because it allows for the collection of standardised data 
from sizeable respondents in a highly economic way. It 
was also exploratory given that literature on provider 
payment system under Ghana’s health insurance scheme 
is limited. 
The population of the study comprised National Health 
Insurance Schemes (NHIS) in Ghana, thus, hundred and 
forty-five District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes. 
According to the National Health Insurance Act, 2003 (Act 
650), the schemes that may be established in Ghana are 
the Private Commercial Health Insurance, Private Mutual 
Health Insurance Scheme and District Mutual Health 
Insurance Scheme.  At the time of the study, District 
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes were the predominant 
types in the country. The District Mutual Health Insurance 
Schemes therefore constitutes the primary unit of analysis 
in this paper. 
Mainly, two stages of contacts were undertaken in 
this study. The first was pilot discussions with some 
scheme managers and officers from the National Health 
Insurance Commission to obtain experts’ advice, 
firsthand information and general understanding of issues 
concerning the accounting systems of the schemes in 
Ghana.  The aim of this was to get the necessary input 
for designing questionnaires. Again, a pilot study was 
conducted to pre-test the instrument, which contributed 
to reshaping the instruments. The second phase was the 
administration of the questionnaires to some unit heads in 
the selected schemes, service providers and subscribers 
of the scheme. Questions on the instrument were mainly 
captured through a five-point likert scale (strongly agree, 
agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree). Cronbach 
alpha was used to test for reliability and yielded a 
positive reliability index of 0.76 and 0. 67 for schemes 
and subscribers instruments respectively. This phase also 
included structured interviews with some officers in the 
accounting and operations departments of the National 
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA).
Purposive and convenience sampling techniques were 
used for the study. The purposive technique allowed for 
objective judgmental selection of cases, which best suited 
the objectives of the study. As a result, schemes were 
selected from the Greater Accra, Central, Ashanti and the 
Brong-Ahafo regions. These regions were chosen based 
on preliminary discussions at the headquarters of NHIS 
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secretariat, which suggested that schemes in the Brong-
Ahafo and Ashanti regions were relatively performing 
better while the schemes in Greater Accra and Central 
regions were reporting some abysmal performances. 
Again, given that Greater Accra is the administrative 
capital of Ghana, more qualified personnel will handle 
schemes in the region. At the regional level, cluster 
sampling was used to select representatives from the 
districts; that is, the four regions were clustered into 
southern and northern sectors and at least six (6) districts 
were selected from each sector. All the schemes in Greater 
Accra Region were selected as part of the sample. In 
addition to the districts, the National Health Insurance 
Authority, being the apex regulatory body of the schemes 
was selected to enquire into the operational requirements 
of the schemes. In each of the selected schemes, three 
employees were selected. These three persons were the 
Scheme Manager, Accountant, and Claim Officer. In all, 
seventy officers at the district schemes and thirty service 
providers were used as sample for the study. At the level 
of the NHIA, two accountants and two other workers from 
the operational department were selected for interviews. 
Table 1 shows the schemes selected for the study.
Table 1
Sampled Schemes
Brong-Ahafo Ashanti Greater Accra Central
Nkoranza Asokwa Okaikoi Mfantseman
Techiman Subin Sub-Metro Ablekuma Awutu-Effutu Senya
Tano North Manhyia Sub-Metro Ashiedu Keteke Sub-Metro Oguaa Mansin
Tano South Bantama Sub-Metro Osu Klottey Sub-Metro Komenda-Edina Eguafo Abirem
Sunyani Amansie Central Tema Metropolitant Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese
Kintampo Amansie East Kpeshie Sub-Metro Agona
Wenchi Ga-Dangme West
Jaman South
Source: Compile by authors, 2009
All elementary ethical issues such as anonymity, 
confidentiality and voluntary participation were ensured. 
Data was edited, coded and entered into Statistical 
Package and Service Solution version 16.  During the 
data analysis, agree and strongly agree were merged 
while strongly disagree and agree were also merged since 
they measured similar indicators (support or oppose). 
Mainly descriptive results are presented in the paper. 
These descriptive results have, however, been presented 
a prose because our analysis often yielded a dichotomous 
outcomes as a result of merging disagree/strongly disagree 
and agree/strongly disagree.
RESULTS 
Among the myriad of issues the study sought to 
investigate was the extent to which the various schemes 
achieved reasonable cash flow and in turn serves as a 
motivation to continue to provide services to subscribers. 
In all, the majority of schemes (66.7%) do not achieve 
reasonable cash flow and the remaining 33.3 percent are 
able to achieve a reasonable cash flow. This is worsened 
by poor payment from the schemes to service providers, 
confirmed by 86 percent of respondents. Motivation 
among service providers on the other hand appeared weak. 
Approximately 52 percent of providers were discontent 
with the current synergy of motivation between service 
providers and the scheme managers. However, almost all 
(94%) of respondent agreed that a well-designed provider 
payment system could prevent waste and unnecessary 
service provision.  Similar high proportions (79%) of 
respondents confided that the choice of provider payment 
system (PPS) affects the value of health care, cost 
containment and administration of the scheme. 
Again, the results point out that 48 percent of the 
providers believe that the PPS affects the value of service 
they provide to subscribers.  This is quite significant 
because providers’ deal with human life so it is important 
to choose a PPS that will ensure that quality health care 
is provided for subscribers. It is managerially prudent 
for organisations to exercise maximum controls over 
their expenditure levels. Hence, it was relevant to find 
out whether expenditure accounts of the various schemes 
were entered in the necessary ledgers. Out of the 62 
respondents, 48 representing 77 percent were of the view 
that such proper procedures were followed. It is also 
instructive to note that the majority of schemes (89%) 
required their employees to seek necessary authorisations 
before payments and appropriate personnel executed this 
task in most cases (98%). 
Another issue the study explored was diligent practices 
that scheme operators complied with in payment to 
providers. Documentation therefore becomes a relevant 
persuasion. Supporting documents are extremely 
important as far as payment of expenditure is concerned. 
Thus, the survey asked about the types of documents used 
for making claims. As shown in Table 2, the predominant 
means of claims verification is the claims forms revealed 
that 29 percent (97% of cases) of the schemes required 
service providers to provide claim forms for before 
payment, 20.5 (68%) percent require providers to 
complete prescription cards; 20 (65%) percent called for 
health facility attendance card. The remaining figures 
are presented in Table 2. Similar, responses were also 
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observed among service providers. For instance, 23 
percent (78%) of service providers indicated that claim 
forms were the obligatory verification documents required 
from the service providers.
Table 2
Required Documents for Claims Indicated by NMHI 
Schemes Personnel
Required document N Per cent Multiple responses (%)
Treatment Costing Sheet 25 12.2 40.3
Health Facility Attendance card 40 19.5 64.5
Diagnostic card 38 18.5 61.3
Prescription card 42 20.5 67.7
Claims form 60 29.3 96.8
Total 205 100.0 330.6
Source: Field Survey, May 2009: Multiple responses exist
In order to ensure that service providers complied with 
required procedures in providing health care and making 
claims, a question as to whether claims can be refused was 
put to the scheme operators, providers and NHIA officials 
interviewed.  All the results indicated that claims can be 
refused by the scheme operators. All respondents from 
both health providers and scheme operators affirmed that 
claims could be refused.
Some of the conditions can necessitate claims 
are falsely or incorrectly declared, failure to comply 
with agreement, over-servicing of patients, irrational 
medication and prescriptions, provision of services 
beyond the authorised capability, unnecessary diagnostic 
and therapeutic procedures and use of fake, adulterated 
or substandard pharmaceuticals. Reasons given among 
service providers also includes excess billing, unapproved 
drugs, computational errors, drugs costing more than 
stated price, expired before submission to the schemes’ 
offices, improper claims preparation, incomplete 
documentation, over charging and over prescription. 
Others are treatment of diseases not covered by the 
scheme, presentation of claims without diagnosis, drugs 
not included on claims sheet and wrong documentation. 
Late submission of claims was, however, not observed to 
be sufficient (22%) condition for claims refusal.  
It is expected that claims are properly vetted to ensure 
that the above-mentioned reasons for refusing claims are 
identified. We also sought to find out whether claims were 
vetted before payments. Seventy-four percent of scheme 
operators attested to vetting of claims before payment. 
An interview with one of the scheme personnel suggested 
that after vetting, the percentage difference is paid to 
providers and if there is the need to reduce the claims, 
it is then taken out of the remaining unpaid amount. 
Averagely, it took two weeks to one month before for 
claims to be appropriated. In an interview with an NHIA 
official, it emerged that scheme operators are required to 
make claims within 60 days after provision of service, 
which were to be responded in payment within 40 days, a 
responsibility that is imposed by Act 650 of the NHIS law. 
In terms of intermittent delays in claims reimbursement, 
there was general consensus between service providers 
(100%) and scheme operators (95%). 
Some hindrances that usurped the aptitude of scheme 
operators to swiftly reimburse service providers were 
inadequate funding (43%) lack of staff to process claims 
(25%), awkward (21%) claims processing and inadequate 
information (12%). Service providers also confirmed some 
of the reasons for delays in claims payment offered by the 
scheme operators. Weak consistency in funding, which 
ranked predominant, according scheme operators was also 
accounted for by irregular release of subsidies, accounting 
for 57 percent of the total responses.  The second major 
reason was irregular payment of contributions (25%). 
The study revealed that subsidies and contributions 
are the major sources of funds for the health scheme. 
Interviews with some of the respondents revealed that the 
schemes depend heavily on subsidies because premium 
contributions are a very small part of the scheme’s total 
funding.  Collection of revenue from the informal sector is 
quite a difficult task, because most of them will only want 
to part with funds when they will realise direct benefits.
Satisfaction of payment systems of the scheme 
was also assessed from the operators’ perspective. The 
results showed that the majority of operators (94%) 
assessed the payment system as satisfactory while the 
remaining six percent expressed dissatisfaction with 
the schemes’ payment systems.  Similar results were 
found among service providers. Service providers were 
found to be satisfied with prevailing levels of motivation 
provided received from scheme operators.  Thus, 79 of 
the respondents indicated that the level of motivation 
of providers is satisfactory whereas 21 percent of 
respondents were not satisfied. Appreciable levels of 
satisfaction of motivators provided by scheme operators 
are also seen among service providers.  
DISCUSSIONS
This study was partly prompted by the growing worldwide 
demand for quality information for sound decision making 
and sound management of public funds, particularly, 
health. In the case of Ghana, this demand becomes more 
apparent given that all Ghanaians pay a consumption tax 
of 2.5 percent as National Health Insurance Levy, both 
subscribers and non-subscribers have a stake in it and are 
interested in the reliability of the scheme. 
The results specify that majority of the respondents 
from the health schemes strongly agree or agree that 
the payment system must allow providers to achieve a 
reasonable cash flow, in order to motivate them. They also 
believe and that the choice of provider payment system 
affects the value of health care services cost containment 
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and administration of the scheme. The survey revealed 
that 67 percent of respondents from the service providers 
feel that the payment system of the health scheme does 
not allow them to achieve reasonable cash flow while 
33 percent perceive otherwise.  Furthermore, think that 
the payment system does not motivate them to continue 
providing services for subscribers. However, 52 percent 
of the service providers think that the payment system 
does not affect the value of services they provide to the 
subscribers.  
Most respondents strongly agree that adequate controls 
must be made over payments in terms of keeping proper 
records of expenditures, authorizations, and using the right 
ledgers in recording expenditures. The major documents 
used for making claims are claims forms, prescription 
card, health facility attendance card, diagnostic card 
and treatment costing sheet. Majority of the respondents 
(75.8%) from the scheme indicated that providers are 
able to follow the required procedure for making claims. 
It also came to light that, from time to time, the health 
scheme operators meet the service providers to train them 
on the best ways claims can be filed. Service providers, 
who failed to comply with the claim filing procedures, 
may either have their claims reduced or rejected.  All 
claims are vetted before full payments are made, but 
because vetting procedures are cumbersome, some 
schemes pay part of the claims before completing the 
vetting. 
All service providers (100%), majority of scheme 
operators (95.2%) and the NHIA agreed that payment of 
claims sometimes delays. Majority of the respondents 
indicated that the reasons for the delays are lack of 
funds, lack of staff, and cumbersome claim processing 
procedures. The scheme operators indicated they do 
not always have funds for the settlement of claims; the 
main reason for the lack of funds is irregular payment 
of subsidies.  The results indicate that the delay in the 
payment of claims is not due to accounting system error. 
The assessments of the provider payment system by 
respondents from the health scheme, providers and NHIA 
officials indicated that generally the provider payment 
system of the scheme is satisfactory. Majority of the 
providers also indicated that their level of motivation to 
provide services for the subscribers is satisfactory.
CONCLUSIONS
The study established that providers represent the spending 
side of the health scheme. Case based payment (diagnostic 
related), and fee-for-service payment techniques, are 
used for payment of claims. Generally, there are delays 
in the payment of claims because subsidies released are 
not sufficient for the payment of claims and also they 
are not released on time. Though schemes can apply for 
reinsurance, the process for claiming it is cumbersome. 
Therefore, it appears from the results that delay in 
payment of claims is due both to accounting system errors 
(i.e. cumbersome procedures in claiming reinsurance) and 
accounting system failure (i.e. lack of funds, lack of staff 
for processing, and inadequate information). Though the 
payment system is rated as satisfactory, it does not allow 
providers to achieve reasonable cash flow and as such it 
affects the value of health care provided to subscribers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The manual vetting of claims should be changed to a 
computerized one.  The number of documents used for 
making claims should also be standardized into one form, 
so that providers will not need to fill many forms for 
making claims.  This will in the end reduce the vetting 
process. The number of core staff employed for schemes 
by the NHIA should be increased to ensure that a certain 
minimum number of employees are in each department. 
The current system where there is only one person for 
each department does not encourage effectiveness of 
internal control.  The schemes should also do well to 
employ other supporting staff. Health insurance is often 
associated with high costs; hence it is fundamental for the 
schemes to contain costs.  Since the moral hazard is on the 
part of both providers and patients, varied sets of tools can 
be used to reach this goal. According to Hsiao & Shaw 
(2007), copayment and coinsurance are measures that 
can be used to reduce the risk of moral hazard. Gottret 
& Scheiber (2006) also indicated that the tools that can 
be used to reduce moral hazards are performance-related 
provider payment systems, expenditure caps, risk adjusted 
capitation arrangements, well-designed contractual 
agreements between providers and health insurance 
schemes, and good monitoring of the system.  It is 
important to note that cost containment is a vital element 
for the success or failure of health schemes; thus, adequate 
measures should be put in place to ensure sustainability. 
To ensure financial sustainability, subscribers and service 
providers must be educated to know the implications of 
putting too much pressure on the health fund.
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